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royalist pamphlets and popular works on history. During the Consulate and the Empire Ferrand lived in absolute retirement in France, but the Restoration drew him from his obscurity, and he was in 1814 created a count, made a member of the Académie Française, and appointed director of the French post-office. The greater part of his memoirs deals with the early governments of Louis XVIII., and throws considerable light upon the internal history of this period. His account of the drawing up of the Charter of 1814 is of prime authority, and his chapter on the difficulties which beset Louis XVIII. during the first days of the Restoration is brief but important. He was acting Minister of the Marine when Napoleon left Elba, and his narrative of the Hundred Days throws a new light upon that period. From 1815 to 1823 Ferrand was in a position which enabled him to follow the work of the administration, and nothing of more primary importance for this period has been published within recent years. It only remains to be said that the Vicomte de Broc has done his work admirably and that he has appended the valuable little biographical foot-notes which are always to be found in modern editions of French historical memoirs with profusion and accuracy.

H. MORSE STEPHENS.

The Campaign of Marengo, with Comments. By HERBERT H. SARGENT, First Lieutenant and Quartermaster, Second Cavalry, United States Army. (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co. 1897. Pp. 240.)

IN 1800 Napoleon was thirty, within two years as old as Alexander at his death. He had won his rank as a strategist and tactician in 1796; he had deservedly made himself First Consul. Mainly by his efforts civil war had been suppressed; France had been saved from financial ruin; the morale of the nation and the army had been restored. Napoleon had deserved well in that he had not despaired of the republic.

Peace was desired; but events were set for war. England commanded the sea, but remained inactive. Austria held all northern Italy with 120,000 men under brave but aged Melas, confronted in the Genoa region by tenacious Masséna with one-third the force; while on either side of the Rhine stood Kray and Moreau, each with an army of about 125,000 men.

Napoleon, in supreme command, was secretly raising an Army of Reserve. Assembled near Geneva, it could succor either Masséna or Moreau. Austria was attacking on two lines separated by the Alps, while France might debouch from central Switzerland against either of her armies. The best Austrian soldier, the Archduke Charles, had been shelved, and the Aulic Council assiduously kept both Kray and Melas misinformed. The Army of Reserve was assembled without their knowledge. Kray and Melas believed that every French soldier stood in their front. From Paris Napoleon watched each move, understood the meaning of every

situation. No man has comprehended the great game of war in the same broad and yet detailed sense. Lesser lights have since jeered at Napoleon's pincushion maps, and at Jomini's diagrams; but the man who, for his own instruction or another's, can so give a clear object lesson, proves that he has mastered his subject. The captain must think clearly before he can act clearly.

Masséna's duty in the general scheme was to occupy the attention of Melas; and he was abreast of the task. Though literally starved out of Genoa, he contained his thrice greater opponent until Napoleon could descend upon his rear. Though able, Moreau lacked his chief's audacity, and rejected Napoleon's bold manœuvre, by which he might turn Kray out of his position and compromise his army. But rank and file confided in Moreau; Napoleon needed the man, and he was permitted to play his own game. This he did respectably, not brilliantly. He might have destroyed Kray; he did actually defeat him.

Meanwhile Napoleon assembled his Army of Reserve, 55,000 strong, and crossed the Alps. This march he and his adulators have been fond of likening to Hannibal's daring feat. It was in no sense comparable to that wonderful performance, nor indeed to the march of Alexander across the Hindu Kush. But it was splendid in execution as in conception, utterly unexpected by the enemy, and successful. By the 25th of May, despite the almost fatal check at Bard, his five corps had descended into the valley of the Po. He was within reach of the communications of Melas; his own were secure.

The pass of Stradella, where the Apennines meet the Po, has always played its part, as all great topographical features must, in the campaigns of northern Italy. Hannibal calculated on it; Prince Eugene won Turin because of it; Napoleon saw that it was the gate through which Melas must retreat. Hastening to Milan, after a diversion leading Melas to believe he was aiming at Turin, Napoleon was compelled to await his reinforcements; but he reached Stradella and camped there on the 6th of June, astride the line of retreat of Melas, who had just awakened to the meaning of the problem. Melas had not drawn diagrams, mentally or otherwise.

The strategy of the campaign of Marengo was magnificent; that leading up to the battle and the tactics of the battle itself were full of audacity, but lacking in discretion. Purposing a battle near Stradella, Napoleon failed to concentrate all his forces there, lest Melas should escape by the north of the Po; he advanced to Marengo without sufficiently reconnoitring, detached Dessaix, and was outnumbered and surprised on the battle-field. Had not Melas's personal exhaustion prevented continuance of the handsome effort which defeated the French in the forenoon; had not Dessaix marched back to the sound of the guns; had not Napoleon been fortunate in his lieutenants—had he indeed not been Napoleon—Marengo would have been a lost battle. His manœuvre was perfect up to Stradella; he then gambled on the chances; and any one but Napoleon would have miscarried.

All this is told by Lieutenant Sargent in an interesting and especially perspicuous manner. What may be called the modern military criticism, *i. e.*, that which the reader may compare to modern examples, often within his own experience, dates only from the present generation. Jomini, though we all go back to him with a keener sense of enlightenment, appeals rather to the soldier than to the civilian; but out of the modern critic's book any intelligent reader may, without effort, grasp the salient points of a military situation. Turgid criticism preceding Lloyd arose from turgid ideas. Lloyd was the first to see and tell why Frederick accomplished his astounding results. Jomini's diagrams first enunciated what Napoleon had evolved from the deeds of his predecessors—the modern art of war. Since Jomini, military criticism has grown to appeal more directly to the civilian. Just as nowadays a layman may better understand the law applicable to his own peculiar case than in the days of Coke, so may he better comprehend the underlying motives of this or that manœuvre on a strategic or tactical field, than a century ago.

Lieutenant Sargent is one of the most interesting of our modern military critics; and, recognizing that no single chapter can do a campaign justice, he is happy in choosing to devote each of his volumes to a single campaign.

Marengo has been so fully discussed heretofore that it is no detraction from this work to say that there is perhaps small room for novel ideas upon the subject; but the author's presentation of the events which led up to the battle and of the battle itself shows a good sense of proportion, keen appreciation of the value of facts, and an agreeable, easy style. Future volumes will be warmly welcomed.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.

The Life of Francis Place; 1771–1854. By GRAHAM WALLAS, M.A. (New York, London and Bombay: Longmans, Green and Co. 1898. Pp. x, 415.)

THE special value of Mr. Wallas's *Life of Francis Place* is at once obvious to students of English constitutional and party history of the period between the French Revolution and the abolition of the Corn Laws. Biographies and volumes of memoirs and letters coming within these sixty years have been published in large numbers during the last twenty-five years. First-hand material of this kind has been constantly growing in volume; but up to the present time there has been no authoritative book covering that part of the movement for constitutional reform with which Francis Place was so conspicuously identified. Place was never of the House of Commons. Although he began life as a working tailor, quite early in his career he had a shop of his own, and was exceedingly prosperous. In the days of the unreformed Parliament, it would have been easy for a man of his wealth to have bought a seat in the House of Commons, as was done by Hume, Ricardo, Romilly and other men who were on the popular side in the Reform movement. Place never availed himself of this opportunity; yet no man, in or out of Parliament,